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                            ----------  
  
                       OPINION OF THE COURT 
  
                            ----------  
  
GARTH, Circuit Judge:  
 
 Michael Tarbuck appeals the district court's order of 
October 14, 1994, which permanently enjoined Tarbuck from 
encroaching on rights of way owned by Columbia Gas Transmission 
Corporation.  Tarbuck argues that the amount in controversy 
between Columbia and himself does not exceed $50,000 as required 
by 28 U.S.C. § 1332.   
 The district court found that Columbia owned two fifty 
foot rights of way over Tarbuck's property and that it would cost 
Tarbuck $4,000 to remove the overburden which had been placed by 
Tarbuck on the rights of way.  Tarbuck argues that $4,000 is the 
amount in controversy.  The Supreme Court's decision in Glenwood 
Light Co. v. Mutual Light Co., 239 U.S. 121 (1915), however, 
settled that in diversity suits for injunctions the cost of 
compliance is not the definitive measure of the amount in 
controversy.  Rather, we measure the amount in controversy by the 
value of the rights which the plaintiff seeks to protect.   
 Because the value to Columbia of protecting the rights 
of way by this action is alleged to be in excess of the 
jurisdictional minimum and the actual value to Columbia is not 
legally certain to be less than the jurisdictional threshold, we 
conclude that federal jurisdiction exists.  Accordingly, we will 
affirm the district court's judgment in favor of Columbia.  In 
4 
doing so, we hold that the district court had jurisdiction under 
28 U.S.C. § 1332 and that Columbia's rights of way are indeed 
fifty feet wide. 
 
I. 
 Michael Tarbuck owns two parcels of land adjacent to 
Route 19 in Southwestern Pennsylvania.  Pursuant to two separate 
deeds, Columbia owns rights of way across the parcels to operate 
a twenty inch natural gas pipeline.  In December 1993, Columbia 
sought a preliminary and a permanent injunction, requiring 
Tarbuck to remove the overburden on the rights of way (i.e. the 
three to six feet of excess topsoil which Tarbuck placed on 
Columbia's rights of way).  Columbia also sought an order 
preventing Tarbuck from placing any further topsoil on the 
easements. 
 In his answer, Tarbuck denied any encroachment, denied 
that Columbia's right of way was fifty feet in width, and claimed 
that the district court lacked jurisdiction because the amount in 
controversy did not exceed $50,000. 
 To sustain its claim to diversity 
jurisdiction,1Columbia introduced the following evidence which 
the district court accepted.  Columbia engineers testified that 
the overburden placed additional pressure on the pipe which could 
result in a possible rupture.  Further, the engineers testified 
                     
1
  For purposes of diversity, Columbia is a citizen of Delaware 
and West Virginia.  Tarbuck is a citizen of Pennsylvania. 
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that the overburden interfered with instruments used in periodic 
federally mandated inspections of the protective coating of the 
pipeline. The district court recognized that if the pipeline were 
to leak, the escaping gas could migrate to a nearby building or a 
nearby road and explode, causing significant personal and 
property damage.  The district court also concluded that Columbia 
was presently violating the applicable federal regulations and 
thus could not continue to operate the pipeline under these 
conditions indefinitely. 
 The district court also determined the following.  It 
would cost approximately $4,000 for Tarbuck to remove the excess 
cover.  Alternatively, it would cost Columbia $100,000 to raise 
the pipe to the appropriate level within the existing right of 
way or $1,000,000 to relocate the pipeline to different property. 
Neither party presented any evidence as to the value of the 
rights of way nor the value of Tarbuck's land whether or not 
burdened by the rights of way. 
 Based on these facts, the district court concluded that 
the amount in controversy exceeded $50,000.  It further concluded 
that Tarbuck had encroached on the rights of way by placing 
additional topsoil over the pipeline and entered a permanent 
injunction requiring the removal of the overburden. 
 Turning to the width of the rights of way, the district 
court found that Columbia's predecessor in interest obtained the 
easements in the 1940s by two deeds.  While one deed expressly 
provided for a fifty foot right of way, the other deed stated no 
width. 
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 Columbia introduced evidence that it had regularly 
mowed twenty five feet to either side of its pipeline.  Further, 
it used the whole fifty feet in 1981 to replace part of the pipe. 
Finally, Columbia's engineers testified that Columbia needed 
fifty feet to maintain or repair the line because occupational 
safety regulations required that Columbia slope the excavation 
and place equipment safely around the stretch of pipe being 
repaired. 
 Tarbuck was on notice of Columbia's claim to fifty feet 
before he acquired the property.  Three months before purchasing 
the property in April 1991, Tarbuck tacitly acknowledged the 
existence of a fifty foot right of way when he sought information 
on the building restrictions imposed by the rights of way. 
Representatives of Columbia marked the location of the pipeline 
with flags for Tarbuck and completed the Location of Gas Lines 
form which he signed.  The Columbia form Tarbuck signed 
explicitly stated that the rights of way were fifty feet in 
width. 
 Based on this evidence, the district court concluded 
that each of the rights of way was fifty feet in width. 
 
II. 
 The principal issue on appeal is whether the amount in 
controversy exceeds $50,000.  28 U.S.C. § 1332 provides that: 
The district courts shall have original 
jurisdiction of all civil actions where the 
matter in controversy exceeds the sum or 
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value of $50,000, exclusive of interest and 
costs, and is between . . .  citizens of 
different States . . . . 
Tarbuck argues that we must measure the amount in controversy by 
reference to the cost ($4,000) of removing the overburden. 
Columbia principally contends that the appropriate measure of the 
jurisdictional amount is either the cost of the injuries which 
could result if the pipeline leaked or the cost of possible 
federal fines that could be imposed.  At oral argument, Columbia, 
citing Glenwood Light Co. v. Mutual Light Co., 239 U.S. 121 
(1915), additionally claimed that the value of maintaining its 
rights of way without interference from Tarbuck must be 
considered in determining the jurisdictional amount in 
controversy.   
 The amount in controversy is measured by reference to 
the value of the rights which Columbia possesses by virtue of the 
rights of way.  We hold that because it is not legally certain 
that the value of these rights is less than $50,000, section 1332 
was satisfied, thereby meeting federal jurisdictional 
requirements. 
 A party who invokes the jurisdiction of the federal 
courts has the burden of demonstrating the court's jurisdiction. 
McNutt v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 189 
(1936).  In diversity cases, we generally accept a party's good 
faith allegation of the amount in controversy, but where a 
defendant or the court challenges the plaintiff's allegations 
regarding the amount in question, the plaintiff who seeks the 
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assistance of the federal courts must produce sufficient evidence 
to justify its claims.  Burns v. Massachusetts Mutual Life 
Insurance Co., 820 F.2d 246, 248 (8th Cir. 1987).   
 The test for determining the amount in controversy in 
diversity cases was established by the Supreme Court in St. Paul 
Mercury Indemnity Co. v. Red Cab. Co., 303 U.S. 283 (1938). 
The rule governing dismissal for want of 
jurisdiction in cases brought in the federal 
court is that, unless the law gives a 
different rule, the sum claimed by the 
plaintiff controls if the claim is apparently 
made in good faith.  It must appear to a 
legal certainty that the claim is really for 
less than the jurisdictional amount to 
justify dismissal.  The inability of 
plaintiff to recover an amount adequate to 
give the court jurisdiction does not show his 
bad faith or oust the jurisdiction.  Nor does 
the fact that the complaint discloses the 
existence of a valid defense to the claim. 
But if, from the face of the pleadings, it is 
apparent, to a legal certainty, that the 
plaintiff cannot recover the amount claimed, 
or if, from the proofs, the court is 
satisfied to a like certainty that the 
plaintiff never was entitled to recover that 
amount, and that his claim was therefore 
colorable for the purpose of conferring 
jurisdiction, the suit will be dismissed. 
Id. at 288-89 (emphasis added and footnotes omitted).  Red Cab 
gave rise to two jurisdictional principles.  First, dismissal is 
appropriate only if the federal court is certain that the 
jurisdictional amount cannot be met; the reasonable probability 
that the amount exceeds $50,000 suffices to vest the court with 
jurisdiction.  Second, the ultimate failure to prove damages over 
$50,000 does not belatedly divest the federal court of 
jurisdiction unless the proofs at trial demonstrate that the 
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plaintiff never had a colorable claim that exceeded $50,000.  In 
that latter circumstance, the case will be dismissed.  Jones v. 
Knox Exploration Corp., 2 F.3d 181 (6th Cir. 1993); Ehrenfeld v. 
Webber, 499 F. Supp. 1283, 1294 (D. Me. 1980).2 
 Where the plaintiff in a diversity action seeks 
injunctive or declaratory relief, the amount in controversy is 
often not readily determinable.  Under those circumstances, the 
amount in controversy is determined by "the value of the object 
of the litigation."  Hunt v. Washington Apple Advertising Comm'n, 
432 U.S. 333, 347 (1977); McNutt v. General Motors Acceptance 
Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 191 (1936).  Unfortunately, this phrase has 
proven less than clear in its application to the many different 
claims for equitable relief that have arisen out of our diversity 
jurisdiction.  1 James Wm. Moore, Moore's Federal Practice § 0.95 
(2d ed. 1995). 
 The case which most closely approximates the current 
case is Glenwood Light Co. v. Mutual Light Co., 239 U.S. 121 
(1915).  Glenwood Light sought the removal of Mutual Light's 
poles and wires, which had been constructed adjacent to 
Glenwood's poles and wires in a manner which endangered the 
operation and maintenance of Glenwood's facilities.  The district 
court found that the removal of the encroaching wires would cost 
$500, well below the then $3,000 jurisdictional minimum, and 
                     
2In a substantially different context, we recently held that a 
contract which limits liability to $50,000 did not satisfy the 
amount in controversy.  Valhal Corp. v. Sullivan Associates, 
Inc., 44 F.3d 195, 209 (3d Cir. 1995).  But see Valhal Corp. v. 
Sullivan Associates, Inc., 48 F.3d 760 (3d Cir. 1995) (statement 
sur denial of petition for rehearing). 
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dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction.  The Supreme Court 
disagreed.  
 We are unable to discern any sufficient 
ground for taking this case out of the rule 
applicable generally to suits for injunction 
to restrain a nuisance, a continuing 
trespass, or the like, viz., that the 
jurisdictional amount is to be tested by the 
value of the object to be gained by 
complainant.  The object of the present suit 
is not only the abatement of the nuisance, 
but (under the prayer for general relief) the 
prevention of any recurrence of the like 
nuisance in the future. . . .  
 
 The District court erred in testing the 
jurisdiction by the amount that it would cost 
defendant to remove its poles and wires where 
they conflict or interfere with those of 
complainant, and replacing them in such a 
position as to avoid the interference. 
Complainant sets up a right to maintain and 
operate its plant and conduct its business 
free from wrongful interference by defendant. 
. . . The relief sought is the protection of 
that right, now and in the future, and the 
value of that protection is determinative of 
jurisdiction.   
Id. at 125-26.3 
 Glenwood Light disposes of Tarbuck's argument that the 
cost of removing the overburden is the appropriate measure of the 
                     
3
  We have previously applied Glenwood Light and found 
jurisdiction where discharge from an upstream coal plant created 
a nuisance and continuing trespass to downstream property even 
though the riparian owner had not yet been injured in excess of 
the jurisdictional minimum and the cost of abatement had not been 
settled.  Kelly v. Leigh Nav. Coal Co., 151 F.2d 743, 745 (3d 
Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 327 U.S. 779 (1946).  "It is well 
settled that in an action of this nature, the jurisdictional 
amount is to be calculated on the basis of the property right 
which is being injured.  If that property right has a value in 
excess of $3,000 [the previous jurisdictional threshold] the 
Federal Court has jurisdiction of such a diversity suit even 
though the plaintiff had not suffered $3,000 damage at the time 
suit was instituted."  Id. at 746. 
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amount in controversy.  In Glenwood Light, the Court rejected 
Mutual Light's claims that the $500 cost of removing its 
encroaching poles and wires was the amount in controversy.  We 
similarly reject the argument advanced here by Tarbuck that the 
$4,000 cost of removing the overburden is the amount in 
controversy in this case. 
 In Glenwood Light, the defendant had not questioned 
that the value of the right identified by the Court -- "a right 
to maintain and operate its plant and conduct its business free 
from wrongful interference by the defendant" -- exceeded the 
jurisdictional minimum.  Consequently, the Court concluded that 
federal jurisdiction existed without determining the value of 
Glenwood Light's rights.  Here, however, Tarbuck has argued that, 
even if the measure is not his cost of compliance, the value of 
the rights of way or the value of obtaining the injunction is 
less than $50,000.   
 
III. 
 The record here discloses the cost of two alternatives 
which Columbia might pursue to operate its pipeline without the 
removal of the overburden or without a fifty foot wide right of 
way.  Because Tarbuck had deposited additional soil on the rights 
of way, Columbia's pipeline, which should have been approximately 
three feet from the surface is now located seven feet beneath the 
surface.  Thus, as one alternative, Columbia could raise the pipe 
to the proper depth within the existing rights of way at a cost 
which the district court found to be $100,000.  As a second 
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alternative, Columbia could reroute the pipe on different 
property at a cost which the district court found to be 
$1,000,000.   
 The cost of either alternative clearly exceeds the 
jurisdictional minimum.  No feasible lower cost alternative to 
obtaining the injunction is presented on this record.  Thus, 
jurisdiction exists under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. 
 At oral argument, Tarbuck argued that Columbia could 
have entered the right of way and removed the overburden itself. 
Because Columbia, in doing so, would have had to remain within 
the rights of way (the width of one of which had yet to be 
judicially determined when this action commenced) and would have 
had to dispose of the topsoil it removed, such an action would 
almost certainly cost more than $4,000.  However, we cannot say 
that Tarbuck was unreasonable in suggesting that the overburden 
removal by Columbia might still cost less than $50,000. 
 Tarbuck's calculations however ignore the full measure 
of relief which Columbia seeks.  Columbia seeks not only the 
removal of the excess topsoil but it also seeks an order 
preventing any future encroachment.  To paraphrase Glenwood 
Light, "The object of the present suit is not only the [removal 
of the overburden], but . . . the prevention of any recurrence of 
the like [encroachment] in the future. . . . The relief sought is 
the protection of that right, now and in the future, and the 
value of that protection is determinative of jurisdiction."  239 
U.S. at 125-26.   
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 Given Tarbuck's vigorous defense of this suit and his 
repeated failures to comply with Columbia's requests that he 
cease interfering with the rights of way before the suit began, 
we do not doubt that the injunction sought by Columbia is an 
integral part of the controversy in this case.4 
 We further note that once Tarbuck denied that 
Columbia's rights of way were fifty feet wide, the width of the 
rights of way became an essential part of the controversy. 
Columbia contends that it cannot properly maintain its lines 
without fifty feet in which to make repairs.  Any lesser amount 
would cause Columbia to be out of compliance with state and 
federal occupational safety regulations.  Columbia substantiates 
its claim by the unchallenged testimony that it used the whole 
fifty feet to repair the pipeline in 1981.  If the district court 
were to have determined that Columbia owned less than fifty feet, 
Columbia would apparently have been forced to obtain the 
additional footage or reroute its pipeline.   
 Tarbuck claimed at oral argument that Columbia could 
have obtained the necessary additional width by eminent domain 
for less than $50,000, but there is no evidence in the record to 
substantiate his claim.  Nor is there any evidence from which we 
could conclude that eminent domain proceedings presented a timely 
alternative to Columbia's suit. 
                     
4
  This does not suggest that a litigant may always meet the 
amount in controversy simply by requesting an injunction which 
prevents the recurrence of an allegedly impermissible trespass or 
nuisance.  Such recurrence must not be speculative and the 
alternatives to the injunction must still exceed $50,000. 
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 Our examination of the record does not disclose any 
additional means by which Columbia could operate its lines within 
the parameters of the applicable federal regulations. 
Consequently, we cannot say to a legal certainty that the cost of 
any alternatives available to Columbia is less than $50,000. 
Hence, we have federal jurisdiction over Columbia's claims under 
28 U.S.C. § 1332.5 
 We need not reach Columbia's speculative claims that 
the damage that might result from a leak or that the fines it 
might have to pay in administrative proceedings would exceed 
$50,000.  These claims present Columbia's conjecture, and we will 
not ordinarily consider such speculative arguments in determining 
the amount in controversy.  See Kheel v. Port of New York Auth., 
457 F.2d 46, 49 (2d Cir.) ("[T]he jurisdictional test is 
applicable to that amount that flows directly and with a fair 
degree of probability from the litigation, not from collateral or 
speculative sources."), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 983 (1972); see 
also Healy v. Ratta, 292 U.S. 263, 267 (1934) (refusing to 
consider the collateral effects of the judgment on other claims 
or other plaintiffs in determining the jurisdictional amount). 
IV. 
 Having determined that we have jurisdiction, we turn to 
Tarbuck's claim on the merits that the right of way over one of 
his parcels was less than fifty feet in width.  Under 
                     
5
  Because we conclude that we have jurisdiction under § 1332, we 
need not consider Columbia's claims that we have jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 by virtue of the controversy's 
relationship to the National Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. § 717-717z. 
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Pennsylvania law, ambiguous easements are construed to provide 
the grantee the "`reasonable and necessary' use of the right of 
way within the purpose of the easement and the intentions of the 
original parties to the grant."  Zettlemoyer v. Transcontinental 
Gas Pipeline Corp., 657 A.2d 920, 926 (Pa. 1995) (internal 
citations omitted).  Under this standard, we have little 
difficulty affirming the district court's determination that the 
deed, which did not expressly state a width, nonetheless granted 
Columbia fifty feet.   
 The original deed expressly stated the purpose of the 
grant -- the operation of a pipeline.  Columbia introduced 
testimony that it could not properly maintain or repair the 
pipeline without twenty five feet of work space to either side of 
the pipeline.  Consistent with this assertion, Columbia has 
periodically mowed the full width of fifty feet and used the full 
fifty feet, when it was obliged to replace part of the pipe in 
1981.  Moreover, Tarbuck acknowledged the existence of a fifty 
foot right of way in February 1991 when he signed a Columbia form 
which listed the restrictions imposed on the use of the property 
as a result of the right of way.   
 This evidence confirms that fifty feet is the 
reasonable and necessary width needed to operate a twenty inch 
gas pipeline.  See Columbia Gas Transmission Corp. v. Large, 619 
N.E.2d 1215 (Ohio Misc. 1992) (finding fifty feet to be the 
appropriate width); Roebuck v. Columbia Gas Transmission Corp., 
386 N.E.2d 1363 (Ohio. App. 1977) (same).  The record fully 
supports the district court's conclusion "that the entire right-
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of-way granted to Columbia is 50 feet wide," App. at 314, whether 
considered as a finding of fact, to which we would defer, or as a 
mixed question of law or fact, over which we have plenary review. 
Zettlemoyer, 657 A.2d at 926.  We are satisfied the district 
court did not err; hence, we affirm. 
 
V. 
 Because the cost of the alternatives which would permit 
Columbia to continue to operate its business without interference 
and without obtaining a permanent injunction exceed $50,000, we 
conclude that the amount in controversy satisfies our 
jurisdictional requirement.  On the merits, we will affirm the 
district court's judgment that Columbia's rights of way are both 
fifty feet wide. 
 
